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ABSTRACT
Economic histories of the interwar years view the Great Depression and
the Smoot Hawley Tariff as inextricably bound up with one another. They
assign a central role to the Depression in explaining the passage of the
1930 Tariff Act and at the same time emphasize the role of the tariff in the
propogation of the Depression. This paper argues that popular accounts have
conveyed what is at best an incomplete and at worst a misleading impression
of the relationship between the tariff and the Depression. Rather than
simply strengthening the hand of a Republican Executive predisposed toward
protection or increasing the burden borne by a depressed agricultural
sector1 the uneven impact of the Depression occasioned the birth of a new
protectionist coalition comprised of producers particularly hard hit by
import competition: border agriculture and small—scale industry engaged in
the production of speciality goods. Rather than leading to a dramatic
across—the—board decline in the volume of U.S. imports, the tariff had very
different effects across sectors. Rather than worsening the Great
Depression by reducing foreign demands for U.S. exports, the direct
macroeconomic effect of the tariff is likely to have been expansionary.
This remains true even when feedbacks to the United States and foreign
retaliation are analyzed. In any case, relative to the Depression, the
direct macroeconomic effects of the tariff were small.If Smoot—Hawley had
significant macroeconomic effects, these operated instead through its impact
on the stability of the international monetary system and the efficiency of




Caxibridge,M? 02138As a score of writers have pointed out, the world depression and
the Hawley-Smoot Tariff are inextricably bound up one with the
other, the latter being not only the first manifestation but a
principal cause of the deepening and aggravating of the former.
Jones (1934, p.2)
The intimate connection between the Great Depression and the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff of 1930 was recognized by contemporaries and continues to be
emphasized by historical scholars.1 But just as contemporaries, while
agreeing on its importance, nonetheless viewed the tariff in a variety of
different ways, historians of the era have achieved no concensus on the the
tariff's origins and effects. The definitive study of the Smoot-Jiawley's
origins, by Schattschneider (1935), portrays the tariff as a classic example
of pork-barrel politics, with each member of Congress after his particular
piece of pork. Revisionist treatments characterize it instead as a classic
instance of party politics; protectionism being the household remedy of the
Republican Party, the tariff's adoption is ascribed to the outcome of the
1928 election.2 Surprisingly, proponents of neither interpretation provide
an adequate analysis of the relationship of Smoot-Hawley to the Depression --
inparticular, they fail to establish whether the onset of the Depression
strengthened the movement for the tariff's adoption, and if so why.
Following such contemporary critics of Smoot-Hawley as Bidwell (1932)
and Slichter (1932), one school of macroeconomic thought assigns a large
role to Smoot-Hawley in explaining why the 1929 recession did not follow the
course of previous contractions but culminated instead in the Great
Depression.3 The tariff, if not wholly responsible for the Depression, is
portrayed as a major contributor to its singular depth and long duration.—2-
Others who emphasize monetary aspects of the contraction, although deploring
the tariff's adoption, argue that world trade was collapsing anyway and
treat Smoot-Hawley as a sideshow.4 Finally, there is a school of thought
which suggests that the tariff may have actually had a favorable impact on
the U.S. economy, since it helped to offset the collapse of prices, thereby
enhancing profitability and stimulating domestic production.5
Surprisingly in light of the attention devoted by contemporary
observers to the the relationship of the tariff to the decline and recovery of
different sectors, few recent studies have considered the impact of Smoot-
Hawley at a disaggregated level. Contemporaries debated the question of which
sectors were extended the most generous protection under the 1930 Tariff Act,
some concluding that, in line with Herbert Hoover's 1928 electoral pledge, the
benefits were largely limited to agriculture, others emphasizing upward
revisions of tariff rates on imports of manufactures.6 Still other
commentators suggested that a considerable share of the increase in protection
resulted not from acts of Congress but from the interaction of a falling price
level with import duties denominated in nominal terms. Observers failed to
agree even on the impact of the tariff on the traded goods sector, Free
Traders blaming it for the dramatic fall in U.S. imports in the early 1930s,
Protectionists noting that imports fell across the board and assigning
responsibility to the Depression rather than the tariff.
To a remarkable extent, discussion of these matters proceeds as if the
effect of the tariff on the American economy can be considered in isolation
from its impact on the rest of the world. Insofar as Smoot-Hawley influenced
conditions abroad and elicited retaliation, repercussions were felt in the
United States, particularly by sectors producing exportable goods. Some-3-
accounts attribute to the tariff a causal role not just in the disintegration
of the international trading network but in the difficulties of
primary-product exporting countries, the sovereign debt defaults of the 1930s,
and the closure of the international capital market. Yet asJoseph S. Davis
said of Smoot-Hawley more than a decade ago, "the extent of its influence has
never been satisfactorily assessed."
Perhaps the most striking feature of the literature on Smoot-Hawley is
the extent to which it proceeds in the absence of systematic evidence.
This paper is an attempt to fill that void. It starts byreassessing the
political economy of the 1930 Tariff Act. In Section I the existing
explanations for the tariff's imposition are reassessed and found wanting.
Section II offers a new interpretation of Smoot-Hawley's adoption. Section
III then analyzes the contours of the tariff that emerged from thepolitical
process.
Sections IV and V turn to the macroeconomic impact of the 1930 Tariff
Act. Any such analysis requires a theoretical framework, so a model is used
to order discussion of the tariff's aggregate effects. That framework is
a macroeconomic model of two countries or regions linked together by
international flows of commodities and capital. Since the major countrieswere
all on some form of gold standard when Smoot-Hawley was adopted,gold-standard
rules occupy a prominent place in the specification. This frameworkhelps to
identify the channels through which the tariff's influence was felt and to
isolate the parameters upon which the magnitude of its effects depended. The
model is then calibrated to generate quantitative estimates of the
macroeconomic effects.—4—
Section VI considers the relationship of Smoot-Hawley to the
disintegration of the international monetary system and to sovereign default
by primary producers. These relationships, I argue, provide the principal
channels through which the impact of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff on the Great
Depression was felt. Section VII turns to the question of retaliation.
Section VIII describes an attempt to estimate the impact of import duty
revisions under the 1930 Tariff Act on the quantity of goods imported under
the 13 tariff schedules. The results pinpoint the proximate contribution of
the tariff to the decline in U.S. imports after 1929, and shed light on the
question of which sectors reaped benefits from Smoot-Hawley's imposition.
I. Politics, Pressures and the Tariff
The debate surrounding the passage of the Tariff Act of 1930 remains a
classic study in the political economy of protection. A number of theories
have been developed to explain Smoot-Hawley's adoption, starting with that
advanced in Schattschneider's (1935) classic monograph whose title this
section bears. However, by itself none provides a wholly adequate explanation
for the tariff's adoption.
Schattschneider's influential study "set the tone for a whole generation
of political writing on pressure groups... ."and"cut the lens through which
Americans have since visualized the making of U.S. foreign trade policy..
Schattschneider focused on the influence of special interest groups over the
structure of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff bill. In his account, the actions of
lobbyists and special interests were largely responsible for the tariff's
adoption.—5-
Schattschneider dubbed the principal around which the tariff coalition
organized reciprocal noninterference."10 The coalition was assembled by
offering limited protection to everyone involved. Since only moderate
protection was provided and no single import-competing sector reaped
extraordinary benefits at the expense of others, they could combine in
support of protectionist legislation. In addition, under provisions included
in the original House and Senate bills, credits (or "debentures't) were to be
made available to exporters, extending the coalition beyond the
import-competing to the export-producing sector.11 Not just the number of
commodities on which duties were raised but the very process by which the bill
was passed is invoked in support of the log-rolling interpretation.
Passage required 14 months from the point when Hoover called a special
session of Congress to when the final bill was signed. The record of public
hearings in which the bill was discussed ran to 20,000 pages, while the final
bill provided tariff schedules for more than 20,000 separate items. Since
insurgency was easier under Senate than House rules, log-rolling was more
conspicuous there: the Senate amended the House bill over 1200 times, most
of them on the Senate floor.12 Still other changes were engineered in
conference committee.
If, in contrast to previous tariff legislation as the Fordney—McCumber
bill of 1922, the process and its result reflect the influence of special
interest lobbies, it is important to ask why such groups had suddenly grown so
powerful. Schattschneider provides no explicit answer, although he indicts
Hoover for failing to guide well—defined legislation through Congress.13 But
the systematic explanation implicit in his analysis is the rise of the "new
lobby." Although fraternal, religous, social, and economic groups had always-6-
been part of the American scene, they had never been so well organized or
visible in the Capitol as in the 1920s. According to one observer, "Within
recent years these groups have increased and multiplied. More important
still, they have become highly organized and are to-day conducted by shrewd
and capable leaders."14 In contrast to the old lobby, which was comprised of a
few corporate employees, "wire-pullers" and patronage brokers working behind
the scenes, members of the new lobby worked in the open, representing large if
often specialized interest groups.
A number of influences combined to prompt the rise of the new lobby.
First, the activities of the "muckrakers" in the first decade of the 20th
century had intensified public scrutiny of political affairs. Second, whereas
businessmen had traditionally dealt with government in "a spasmodic and
haphazard fashion," the panic of 1907 spurred them to adopt more systematic
forms of representation.15 Third, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce took a more
prominent role in representing the interests of business, "a development of
great value to both parties concerned. .. [lending]clarity and force to the
opinion of business and simplicity and directness to its relations with
government."16 And fourth, much as the Chamber of Commerce represented
business's general interests, trade associations filled this role for more
specialized groups. A Department of Commerce (1925) publication listed some
1500 organizations classified as trade associations, nearly double the number
known to exist in 1914. Some were organized according to products produced,
others according to materials used, and still others according to markets in
which sales took place. Like the other three influences, the growth of trade
associations was a distinctively 20th century development, but in contrast to
other trends, which had been underway in the early years of the century, the—7—
rise to prominence of trade associations was attributable to effects of World
War I. The war effort required closer ties between government and industry,
but upon attempting to establish them the authorities, finding it difficult to
deal with individual enterprises, requested that associations be formed. If
the war occasioned the formation and growth of many trade associations, the
armistice by no means signalled their demise. Once formed into an association
the process of marshalling a constituency was no longer so difficult.
Improvements in communication, notably the telephone, reinforced these
advantages, and associations quickly learned to use pamphlets and other media
to publicize their case. The adoption of new Congressional rules made it more
difficult for powerful individuals to dictate policy, opening the legislative
process to competing interests.17
The same forces tending to promote effective representation of industrial
interests in Washington encouraged the formation of effective organizations
representing farmers and labor. The American farm movement had long been
distinguished by its inability to organize effectively and represent its
interests before Congress.18 The ad hoc methods of agricultural organizations,
such as sending a representative to Washington in response to alarming
developments, had proven largely ineffectual. For agriculture as for
industry, World War I and the impetus it provided for the formation of the War
Trade Board and the Food Administration caused farmers' organizations to
assume new importance. In 1918 the National Grange opened a permanent
legislative office in Washington, and the militant American Farm Bureau
Federation, founded in 1919, lobbied actively for farm legislation. In
1921 a bipartisan Farm Bloc of senators and congressmen from the South and
West was formed, and it acquired a critical position in the balance of power in—8—
the 66th and 67th Congresses. Although its success in passing farm
legislation was mixed at best and while it quickly fell into disarray, the
prominence of the Farm Bloc did much to alert agricultural interests to the
advantages of effective congressional representation.
The war had a similar impact on the American Federation of Labor. While
maintaining its distance from party politics, by the 1920s the AFL was
commonly acknowledged as the most formidable group in the United States other
than the two political parties.19 Thus, in the 1920s the three principal
American interest groups -business,agriculture and labor --werefor the
first time ably represented in Washington.
The rise of the new lobby is entirely consistent with Schattschneider1s
characterization of Smoot-Hawley as an instance of pork-barrel politics. But
his theory of reciprocal noninterference --thatthe Smoot-Hawley bill by
offering something for everyone garnered widespread support --failsto confront
the question of why the vote on the final bill so closely followed party lines,
with only 5 Democratic Senators voting in favor and 11 Republicans against.
Moreover, it provides no answer to the question of why tariff-rate increases
differed so widely by schedule.
An alternative explanation, recently advanced by Pastor (1980), is that
Smoot-Hawley is simply an instance of party politics. Protection was
regularly advocated by the Republican Party. With the White House occupied by
a Republican President and the Senate in Republican hands, there were few
obstacles to revising upward existing tariff schedules. It is curious that
this straightforward explanation has attracted so little attention. It may be
that partisan aspects of the debate were disguised by the absence of a change
in party in 1928 like that following the 1920 election and preceding the 1922-9-
Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act. Moreover, the issue of protection had not been
a prominant party issue in the 1928 campaign. Although the Democrats had
traditionally campaigned on the basis of staunch opposition to protectionist
measures, in 1928 they moderated their position and joined the Republicans in
endorsing protection, albeit in relatively vague and reserved terms. Where
the Republican Platform reaffirmed the Party's belief in "the protective
tariff as a fundamental and essential principle of the economic life of this
nation" and pledged to consider upward revisions of rates where needed to
protect American labor against low-wage foreign competition, the Democrats
acknowledged the desirability of tariff protection in principle but at the
same time pledged to reduce "monopolistic and extortionate tariff rates" and
to safeguard against "monopoly created by special tariff favors."20 But in
parts of the South, there was for the first time considerable emphasis by
Democratic orators on the policy of protection. Given the extent of
concensus, there was little debate in subsequent Congresses over principles of
free trade and protection. Hence even Free Traders among the Democrats were
ill positioned to mount effective opposition to tariff increases.
The problem with this interpretation is that it provides no explanation
for Smoot-Hawley's timing or its form.It is suggested that Congress was
simply accustomed to engaging in tariff revision every seven years (the
average life of a tariff law between the Acts of 1883 and 1930), and that by
1929 Congress and the public had recovered from the exhausting
Fordney-McCumber discussions of 1920—22. But this mechanical explanation
neither recognizes links between protectionist pressure and economic events
nor provides an explanation for the observed variation in import duty levels.
The explanation coming closest to satisfying these requirements is the- 10—
view of Smoot-Hawley as a response to the problems of American agriculture.21
The explanation runs as follows. While the 1920s had been boom years for the
country as a whole, prosperity had been unevenly distributed. In particular,
agriculture, which had benefited from high prices from 1917 to 1920, failed to
recover from the recession of of 1920-21. For much of the decade, farm gate
prices declined relative to the prices of nonagricultural goods. (See Table 1.)
In 1926, a relatively favorable year for farmers when average wholesale prices
were 51 per cent above their 1913 levels, the prices of farm products were
only 42 per cent above those levels. The explanation for lagging prices was
that World War I had prompted a considerable expansion of agricultural
production outside Europe. While European sugar production, for example, fell
by 50 per cent during the war, the shortfall was offset by expanding output in
Cuba, Java and South America. Once European production recovered, often under
cover of import duties or production subsidies, world prices were permanently
depressed.22 Similarly, war had stimulated the expansion of wheat production
in Argentina, Australia, Canada and the United States. The consequent decline
in prices was magnified -in the second half of the 1920s by the imposition of
import duties on wheat by Germany, Italy and France.
Agrarian distress in the United States took various forms, notably farm
foreclosures which, after averaging 3.2 per thousand farms between 1913 and
1920, rose to 10.7 per thousand in 1921-25 and 17.0 per thousand in 1926_29.23
The foreclosure problem reflected not just the declining relative price of
agricultural products but overall price level trends; since much agricultural
land had turned over between 1917 and 1920 when prices were high, the
subsequent deflation greatly augmented the burden of mortgage debt. The





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Idaho, Montana, North and South Dakota, Colorado and Arizona, from where not
surprisingly the strongest pressures for agrarian relief emanated.
In the 1928 presidential campaign Hoover laid considerable stress on
tariff protection for agriculture. Previously, agriculture had been the
recipient of only modest tariffs, in part because duties on farm imports would
have been ineffective given U.S. status as a net exporter of most agricultural
goods, sugar, wool and hides being the principal exceptions.24 In 1922,
however, the U.S. balance of trade of farm products turned negative, where it
remained except in 1925 for the duration of the decade. (See Table 2.) Hence
an expanding segment of American agriculture grew to appreciate the relevance
of tariff protection.
By this interpretation, Smoot-Hawley was predominantly a form of
agricultural relief. "[T]he farmers of the country wanted as much protection
as had been given to the industrial East.It was for this reason that the
agricultural schedules were boosted to higher levels than ever before."25
Since a significant share of the American population remained rural, farm
interests were able to press their case. Moreover, although the United States
had grown increasingly urbanized over the preceding decades, Congress had not
been reapportioned following the 1920 Census. In 1930 farm interests were
overrepresented in the House, just as, on the two senator per state rule, they
had long been overrepresented in the Senate.
This characterization of Smoot-Hawley as an agricultural measure won by
the West over the opposition of the East is consistent not only with the
partisan interpretation, given the regional concentration of Democratic and
Republican voters, but it explains a number of defections from party ranks.




Foods, Feeds, Unman- tobacco Fruits Meat
and Beverages factured unman. Wheatand Nuts Products
Year Exports Imports Balance ExportsExports Exports ExportsExports
1925 890 918 -28 1060 153 149 102 127
1926 835 953 -118 814 137 202 112 107
1927 883 950 —67 826 139 240 122 71
1928 762 951 -189 920 154 120 129 68
1929 753 955 —202 771 146 112 137 79
1930 542 684 -142 497 145 88 111 66
1931 374 523 —149 326 110 50 109 36
1932 243 404 —161 345 65 33 77 19
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (1976).—12—
Depression, it links the tariff to macroeconomic conditions. Where it fails
is in explaining why tariffs on manufactured imports were raised as part of an
agrarian relief measure, or why the tariff was supported not only by the
representatives of agricultural districts but by those of industrial regions
as well. Many accounts emphasize the extent of discord between agriculture
and industry. "The manufacturing East is represented as being anything but
pleased with the agricultural schedule, whereas the farming West is having a
lot to say about the industrial schedules."26 "Eastern industry thought the
agricultural schedules written into the bill by the Senate were beyond all
reason, but, by the same token, the Western agriculturalist thought the House
had gone stark mad when it wrote the industrial schedules into the bill."27
Vet the final bill passed by a coalition of agricultural and industrial
interests raised agricultural tariffs by an average of 11.57 points and
industrial rates by 5.48 points.28 How could this be?
II. A Model of the Tariff-Making Process
The framework I use to analyze the adoption of Smoot-Hawley is a variant
of Gerschenkron's (1943) model of the political economy of protection in
19th century Germany. This is a member of the class of "interest-group
models" of tariff formation analyzed recently in Conybeare (1985) and McKeown
(1986).I first review Gerschenkron's application of his model to Bismarckian
Germany before adapting it to the analysis of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff.
In Gerschenkron's model, a tariff is adopted when specialized but
well-placed interest groups combine in its support. Gerschenkron divides
German society not merely along sectoral lines such as industry and—13—
agriculture but into heavy industry (producers of basic products such coal,
iron and steel), light industry (manufacturers of consumer goods, along with
whom might be included artisans and shopkeepers), large agriculture (the
Junkers, or large estate owners of Eastern Germany), and small agriculture
(commercial producers located primarily west of the Elbe).He explains the
Bismarckian tariff as a coalition of iron and rye, allying large agriculture
and heavy industry.
In the 1870s as in the 1920s, the impetus for agrarian protection was the
rapid fall in world grain prices. The position of traditional German
agriculture, which specialized in grain, was seriously undermined. The
alternative to continued grain production behind tariff walls was to shift
into the production of high quality foodstuffs such as dairy products and meat
for rapidly expanding urban markets. Cheap imported grain could serve asan
input into such production. But, crucially, large and small agriculture
manifested different capacities to adjust. Differences in soil quality
provided greater scope for the production of dairy products and meat west of
the Elbe. In addition, dairy products, meats and vegetables were most
efficiently produced by relatively skilled labor working on small
owner—managed farms. Hence costs of adjustment were lowest where long-term
leaseholders and small owner—managed farms predominated —-westof the Elbe --
andhighest where landless laborers worked large estates --tothe east in
Prussia. The model predicts that small agriculture should have opposed
agricultural protection due to its impact on Costs, while large agriculture
should have favored it.
Neither light nor heavy industry, with the possible exception ofyarn
spinning, desperately required protection from import competition. Under-14--
competitive conditions, Germany probably would have imported grain and
exported both light manufactures and the products of the basic industries. It
is not clear that, given competition at home but the net export position of
German manufacturers, import duties on industrial goods would have succeeded
in raising the prices of domestically-produced goods.29 Nonetheless, heavy
industry supported the imposition of a tariff on manufactured goods. One
interpretation of this position is that, with high levels of fixed capital, it
was exceptionally susceptible to cyclical fluctuations.30 Tariffs ostensibly
reduced the risk of falling prices, thereby encouraging the fixed investments
which permitted scale economies to be exploited. A more compelling
interpretation is that barriers to cheap imports were a necessary condition
for firms producing basic goods to combine and successfully extract monopoly
profits from domestic users.31 Consistent with this interpretation, producers
of final goods like stoves, pots and pans, shovels, and rakes opposed tariffs
on the products of basic industries because of their impact on production
costs.
What is relevant for our purposes is that no group favored the final
outcome: high tariffs on both agricultural and industrial goods. But because
of the dispersion of interests, action required compromise. The two likely
victors were a coalition of large industrialists and landowners obtaining
general protection, and a coalition of small manufacturers and farmers
successfully defending free trade. Gerschenkron ascribes the victory of the
protectionist coalition to institutional factors. The Junkers, as members of
the squirearchy, occupied a privileged position -in the German political
system. Not only did they staff the bureaucracy and judiciary but in addition
they, like the wealthy industrialists, benefitted from the structure of the—15-
German voting system. Heavy industry, helped by smaller numbers, organized
more effectively than small manufacturing. Managers of large industrial
enterprises formed new associations and worked to convert old ones to
protectionism.32 Their cause was not hurt by the fact that the Chancellor
found protection a useful tool for achieving his political goals, and played
an active role in forging the alliance of iron and rye.
Gerschenkron's model can be applied to the case of the Smoot—Hawley
Tariff by again distinguishing industry by size and agriculture by region.
Naturally, the interests of the different groups and the resulting coalitions
are entirely different from those observed in Bismarckian Germany. So is the
role of the national leadership. Nonetheless, distinctions of region and
scale shed considerable light on the American case.
In the case of Smoot—Hawley, it is useful to distinguish inland (or
sheltered) from border (or unsheltered) agriculture and, as in Germany, light
from heavy industry, where it is light industry and border agriculture that
combined in support of protection. As previously noted, critics of the
Smoot-Hawley Tariff argued that duties on agricultural products would not be
"effective" in raising prices because the U.S. was a net exporter of these
goods.33 In the words of Senator David Walsh of Massachusetts, "The reason why
most duties on agricultural products --eithernew duties or old duties
increased in amount --cannot help the farmer is because they will not be
effective."34 Or as Al Smith remarked during the 1928 Presidential campaign,
the existing 42—cent wheat tariff was no more than a gesture and for all the
benefit the farmer received "it might as well be put at $1.42." The problem
with this contention is that net trade may not be the appropriate indicator of
the effectiveness of a tariff. In the case of Smoot—Hawley, it may mislead-16—
either if there existed segmented regional markets or if products were
differentiated. For goods such as wheat with a high ratio of value to weight,
there existed not merely a national but an international market. But wheat
was not a homogenous product, and the United States both imported and exported
different grades of what was too often regarded in policy debate as a single
commodity. Since little if any exportable surplus of high grade milling wheat
was produced in the United States, for example, the tariff was effective in
raising the Minneapolis price relative to that prevailing in Winnipeg.36 Even
if the product was homogenous, for perishable products the United States was
sufficiently large geographically that transport costs might impede the
equalization of prices across regions. In Walsh's words, "for many products of
agriculture there is in this country no general market, but only a series of
local markets."37 Northern states like Minnesota and densely populated Eastern
Seaboard states like Massachusetts not far removed from Canada's maritime
provinces might find their markets flooded by cheap Canadian potatoes, milk,
cream, butter and eggs. Since these goods could not penetrate further into
the interior because of their high ratio of volume to value, inland producers
might be insulated from competing imports. In contrast, Southern farmers who
engaged in the production of cotton (other than the long staple variety, which
was imported and received a generous increase in tariff protection under the
1930 Act) were oriented toward the export market.38 Therefore, Northern farmers
close to the Canadian border should have favored protection to a much greater
extent than their counterparts in the Interior or the South.
There existed equally sharp divisions within manufacturing. The pressure
for protection was greatest in light industry concentrating in the manufacture
of specialty products. Heavy industry and manufacturers of standardized—17—
products had mechanized their operations and largely held their own against
foreign competition. But the New England textile industry, which, in contrast
to its Southern counterpart, specialized in the production of relatively high—
quality products, experienced growing competition from English mills. In the
bottle-making industry, producers of "fancy ware" such as perfume and toilet
water bottles suffered from an increasing volume of French imports.
Manufacturers of watches faced Swiss competition and and producers of jewelry
complained of German imports. Eastern glove manufactuers experienced
difficulty in matching the prices of foreign goods. The New England shoe
industry experienced competition from Czechoslovak producers. Some producers
were sheltered by relatively generous Fordney-McCumber duties. But, for most,
foreign trends such as the desperate attempts of English mills to hold onto
market share exacerbated their woes.39 Still, only a minority of American
industries were seriously injured by foreign goods.40
In opposition stood heavy industry, particularly segments which relied on
the assembly line and mass production. By the turn of the century, the U.S.
had gained a competitive advantage in many of the industries of the Second
Industrial Revolution, automobiles being a prime example.41 In 1929 motor cars
and parts comprised ten per cent of the value of total U.S. merchandise
exports, while imports were negligible due only partially to a modicum of
tariff protection.42 Given the importance of export sales and the anticipated
impact of a tariff on production costs, the automobile producers, led by Henry
Ford, made clear their opposition to the tariff bill.43 The same was true of
producers of farm machinery and of iron and steel bars, sheet, rails and metal
manufactures .44
The banking community had traditionally lent support to the protectionist-18-
system. Bankers doing business in industrial regions where firms depended on
the tariff favored the maintenance of protection. But in the 1920s their
support was tempered by events. World War I had transformed the United States
from a debtor to a creditor nation and reoriented America's banking business
abroad. As early as 1923 spokesmen for the financial community acknowledged
that Europe's continued ability to service its dollar debt hinged upon foreign
industries' access to American markets.45
A parallel shift was evident in the attitudes of organized labor.
Traditionally, labor had opposed high protection for its impact on the cost of
living. Those narrow groups of workers injured by import competition were
incapable of changing this policy. For half a century the AFL's position on
the tariff had been one of carefully cultivated neutrality. Although
individual unions might lobby for protection against imported goods or for
lower duties on raw materials, the Federation's policy was to take no position
on the issue.46 In 1930 it went only so far as to accede to individual unions'
requests for legislative assistance. However, at the November 1928 AFL
convention the first official caucus of pro-tariff unions was formed. This
"Wage Earners Protective Conference" represented 8 or 9 per cent of the
Federation's membership, the leading participants including the photo-engravers,
wall paper crafts, glass-bottle blowers and potters.47 Clearly, labor's
traditional opposition to protection was tempered by the success of pro-tariff
unions in organizing to lobby for a change in policy.
In sum, the situation in 1930 appeared as follows. Farmers along the
Canadian border and the Eastern seaboard desired higher protection but,
comprising only a minority of American agriculture, found it difficult to
obtain alone. Light industries producing high-quality products also desired—19—
protection but similarly comprised only a portion of American manufacturing.
In principle, neither group favored protection for the other, but each was
willing to support the claims of its counterpart in return for participation
in the coalition. While agriculture received generous protection under the
final Smoot-Hawley bill, so did 1ight industry producing high—quality
products. "If one will cast aside his personal interests, he will admit that
the East and New England have fared relatively well. Some of the important
industries in the six northeast states have received about everything they
could have expected.. "48
This framework has advantages over the view of Smoot-Hawley that divides
the American economy into monolithic agricultural and industrial blocs. It
explains why sections of the industrial Midwest and East, notably Detroit,
should have complained about the height of agricultural tariffs, and why
certain agrarian interests, notably in the South, should have complained of
industrial protection. It is consistent also with the observed alliance of
industrial and agricultural protectionists, and it explains why the
Smoot-Hawley Tariff, originally conceived as agricultural relief, evolved into
a bill extending protection to portions of both industry and agriculture. It
is consistent with Schattschneider's emphasis on log-rolling aspects of the
legislative process, but rather than characterizing the log—rolling as
entirely general suggests that "reciprocal noninterference" should have been
heavily dominated by border agriculture and light industry. It is consistent
with the notion that Hoover lost control of the legislative process by
permitting the debate to extend beyond the question of agricultural relief,
but not necessarily with the opinion of Senator Borah that a narrowly
agricultural tariff could have passed in 1929 had Hoover taken the bit in his-20-
teeth.49 National leadership, while important in both Gerschenkron's and this
paper's application of the model, plays the opposite role in the two
instances, since Bismarck favored widespread protection and played a prominent
role in obtaining it, while Hoover personally opposed blanket protection but
failed to effectively guide the legislative process. By invoking the rise of
the trade association, the model can be used to explain how diffuse
agricultural and industrial interests succeeded in influencing the legislative
process. Finally, its predictions of which sectors lobbied hardest for the
tariff is consistent with the findings of Section VII below of which sectors
reaped the greatest benefits.
This simple model can be elaborated in various directions. One extension
would introduce the long history of protectionism in the United States and the
country's acquired habit of neglecting the impact of its economic policies on
the rest of the world.50 Another would build on the tendency of the Depression
to undermine confidence in the self-equilibrating nature of the market
mechanism. In many countries, the depth of the Depression provided a
rationale for the extension of economic planning. In Britain, for example,
Keynes went so far for a time as to argue for central planning along Soviet
lines.51 In the United States this desire for intervention and control was
most clearly manifest in the New Deal, but the same tendencies contributed to
the pressure for tariff protection -in 1930. As one American author asked in
the course of advocating the tariff, "How can the price-structure be
fortified? How can national income be distributively moralized and
rationalized? The mind of man can conceive of no answer except in terms of
enlarged social governmental control."52 The opponents of protection
acknowledged these tendencies but viewed them as dangerous trends; wrote one,—21—
But now new defenders of the tariff have arisen. The tariff is to
be made an instrument of national economic planning. We are told
to look at Russia, the only country of importance with a greater
trade in 1931 than in 1929. What we are suffering from, it is said,
is not too much tariff but not enough tariff. The world-wide
depression is used as a vivid illustration of the dangers of
international economic interdependence, and we have held up before
us the merits of a self-contained and isolated state.53
At the same time the Depression worked to promote Smoot-Hawley by
undermining confidence in the stability of the market, it altered the costs
and benefits of protection as perceived by the principal interest groups. By
further lowering already depressed agricultural prices, it increased the
pressure agricultural interests brought to bear on elected officials. By
further undermining the already tenuous position of light industries engaged
in the production of specialty products, it reinforced their efforts to
acquire insulation from foreign competition.
III. Features of the 1930 Tariff Act
There is dispute in the literature over the proper way to characterize
the height of the 1930 Tariff Act. A popular description of Smoot-Hawley is,
in the words of Haberler (1976), as a "skyscraper" tariff. But Dornbusch and
Fischer (1984) argue that the Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922 increased the
ratio of duties to either total imports or dutiable imports to the same extent
as Smoot-Hawley. If the 1930 tariff increase only matched the 1922 revision,
the absence of a recession in the wake of Fordney—McCumber casts doubt on the
notion that protectionist measures adopted in 1930 contributed significantly
to the contraction then underway. Dornbusch and Fischer also note that part
of the increase in the average rate of taxation under Smoot-Hawley reflects
the decline in the price level after 1929. Though any such effect is—22—
attributable to Smoot—Hawley insofar as the tariff was a central factor in
causing the Great Depression, not only is the tariff's causal role in
deflation debatable but, even granting it, the effects of price—level trends
should be factored out in order to isolate the magnitude of the initial
commercial initiative.
Table 3 displays the percentage of imports entering duty free and the
average ad valorem equivalent rates of duty. Since the share of imports
entering duty free remains fairly steady over the post World War I period,
most of the variation in duties as a share of import values results from
movements in ad valorem equivalent rates. Between 1921 and 1922 the average
rate of import taxation rose by 9 percentage points, or by 29 per cent of 1921
levels. Between 1929 and 1931 (where 1931 is considered because the
Smoot-Hawley Act was only passed into law in June 1930), the average rate rose
by 13 percentage points, or nearly 33 per cent of 1929 levels. Given the
stability of the share of imports entering duty free, the same conclusion
emerges when import duties as a share of total imports are considered. Both
in percentage points and as a share of pre-existing levels, Smoot-Hawley
increases were in fact larger than those of Fordney-McCumber, but not
overwhelmingly so.
A problem with unadjusted comparisons is that movements in the average ad
valorem rate reflect not only changes in statute but changes in import
composition and price. Price-level effects matter because many duties were
set as specific rates, and such effects could have been substantial given the
extent of price declines after 1929. To take an extreme example, as the price
of peanut oil fell from 12 to 4 cents a pound between 1928 and 1930, the








































































































































































































Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States (1926), pp. 446—447;
Historical Statistics of the United States (1970), p. 888.—23—
equivalent terms. At the same time, changes in import composition could
have exerted a sizeable influence on the average rate, given the extent of
relative price movements over the period.
Tariff Commission estimates of the average rate of taxation on dutiable
imports that would have prevailed in 1926 under the provisions of the 1930 Act
(shown in Table 4) provide an indication of average ad valorem rates in the
absence of both effects. The figures in the last four columns of Table 4,
holding constant import prices and import composition, show that Smoot-Hawley
would have raised import duties by 6 percentage points or 18 per cent of
pre-existing levels, roughly half the amount calculated when commodity-mix and
price-level effects are included.
One can use time series data to estimate the impact of changes in the
price level on the average ad valorem rate of import taxation, regressing the
effective ad valorem rate on the import price level and a variable designed to
capture changes in statute.54 The sample period is those years when
Fordney-McCumber and Smoot-Hawley were in effect. Since the Tariff Act of
1930 was adopted midway through the year, the dummy variable for Smoot-Hawley
takes on a value of zero for years up to 1930, 0.5 for 1930, and 1.0
thereafter. Results appear in Table 5. The contrast between equations
indicates that Smoot-Hawley and price level trends are highly correlated. It
is difficult, therefore, given the length of the time series to obtain precise
estimates of the price-level effect. The point estimate on import prices in
the third equation suggests that for each point by which the price index
declined, the ad valorem equivalent rate of duty rose by 0.17 of a point.
Since that price index declined by 19 points between 1929 and 1931, this
indicates that deflation added three percentage points to the ad valoremTable 4: Duties by Schedule




190119121921 1922 Bill Bill 1930
A.Chemicals 28%26%22% 28.92%31.82% 30.95%36.09%
B.Earthenware, etc. .. 51 51 34 45.52 54.8753.09 53.73
C.Metals 38 34 22 33.71 36.3432.35 35.08
D.Wood 19 12 16 15.84 25.3415.65 11.73
E.Sugar 72 48 31 67.85 92.3677.15 77.21
F.Tobacco 110 82 54 63.09 66.9663.09 64.78
0.Agricultural products 34 29 17 22.37 33.3535.95 35.07
H.Spirits 68 84 47 36.48 47.4447.44 47.44
I.Cotton manufacturers. 50 45 26 40.27 43.1940.59 46.42
J.Flax, hemp, jute .. 45 45 27 18.16 19.0318.95 19.14
K.Wool 70 56 35 49.54 58.0957.38 59.83
L.Silks 53 52 41 56.56 60.1758.03 59.13
M.Pulp and paper ... 24 21 19 24.51 26.1425.91 26.06
N.Sundries 24 24 33 20.99 28.5719.98 28.45
All dutiable imports 49%40%30% 34.80%43.15% 38.98%41.14%
Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1926, p. 551;
Tariff Review (April 1930), p. 99; Tariff Review (July 1930), p. 196.-24-
equivalent rate. While the precision of the estimates does not inspire
confidence, they suggest that the effects of deflation, although nonnegligible,
were considerably smaller than those of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff itself.55
Table 4 displays average tariff rates under the House and Senate bills as
well as the compromise measure hammered out in conference committee. While
the House consistently adopted larger increases than the Senate, different
groups were extended different treatment by the two Houses of Congress. The
figures confirm that the increases bestowed on agriculture were exceptionally
large, but the Senate, where agricultural interests were disproporately
represented, offered the more generous increases, and in many cases the Senate
rates were those ultimately adopted. Of the 887 tariff increases, fully 250
were on agricultural goods. At the same time, the figures support the special
attention paid to border agriculture in Section II above. Tobacco, an
example of a Southern agricultural good, received increases less generous than
the average for dutiable imports. Similarly, there is support for the
distinction between the levels of protection offered modern mass-production
industries and those offered industries producing high—quality products on a
smaller scale. The producers of chemicals, an industry associated with the
Second Industrial Revolution, received relatively modest increases in duty
under the House and Senate bills, while pottery and related products, an
example of a sector characterized by small scale of enterprise and older
technology, received relatively generous increases.
The figures on tariff rates by schedule are more difficult to reconcile
with previous interpretations. Pastor (1980, p.77), for example, argues that
"[tihough there was a general increase on tariffs on agricultural products,
the tariffs on industrial goods were raised so much higher that farmers of theTable 5: Determinants of the Average Effective Ad Valorem Rate
of Taxation of Dutiable Imports, 1922-1933
Equation Constant Smoot-Hawley Price Level R2 OW
1. 38.05 16.93 -- .94 2.35
(0.68) (1.30)
2. 70.02 -— —0.54 .91 1.33
(2.74) (0.05)
3. 47.98 11.93 —0.17 .95 2.10
(8.48) (4.44) (0.14)
Notes: Number of observations =12.Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: See text.—25—
South, the Midwest and the Northwest, concerned over their rising costs of
production, not to say living, ended up opposing the bill." Table 4 indicates
to the contrary that increases on industrial imports did not approach those on
agricultural goods, implying that the bill was opposed mainly by farmers on
whose products import duties were ineffective. Moreover, the figures in Table
4 refer to dutiable imports alone. Most of the 75 items added to the free
list were transferred at the request of agriculture.56
IV. Analyzing Smoot-Hawley's Macroeconomic Effects
The macroeconomic effects of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff have received
particular emphasis in the accounts of Meltzer (1976), Gordon and Wilcox
(1981) and Saint-Etienne (1984). Yet their analyses are neither equivalent
nor compatible. For example, MeItzer (1976, pp.459-50) writes:
After a year of debate, the Hawley-Smoot tariff was approved in June
1930. The tariff raised U.S. import duties substantially,
particularly for agricultural products, and was quickly followed by
higher duties in many countries.
The tariffs restricted the operation of the price-specie-flow
mechanism and the adjustment of the U.S. and the world economy. In
the absence of the tariff, prices in the U.S. would have fallen
relative to prices abroad the change in relative prices would have
increased foreign demand and net exports. With the tariff in effect
in 1930, the U.S. balance of payments shifted from deficit to
surplus; the trade balance declined very little; the monetary gold
stock increased and prices in the U.S. fell by less than prices in
other industries countries....
This argument assigns a largely role to the Hawley-Smoot tariff
in explaining why the 1929 recession did not follow the path of
previous monetary contractions but became the Great Depression.
Meltzer thus appears to emphasize Smoot-Hawley's deflationary impact on the
rest of the world and the damage to the U.S. economy of the international-26—
repercussions. While some pasages appear to suggest that Smoot-Hawley
would have contributed to the contraction of the U.S. economy even in the
absence of retaliation abroad, tariff retaliation nonetheless figures as a
central aspect of the indictment.
Gordon and Wilcox (1981, p.82), while critical of other aspects of
Meltzer's argument, write approvingly of his discussion of the tariff:
Meltzer is on firmer ground when he blames another international
factor, the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act of June 1930, as responsible for
converting a 'sizeable recession into a severe depression.'....The
tariff was responsible for an increase of almost 50 per cent in the
effective rate of duties paid on imports between 1929 and 1932.
This aggravated the contraction through three main channels:
1. Directly, without any retaliation, the resulting increase
in the price of U.S. imports and close substitutes altered the
division of the nominal income decline between output and prices in
1930—32, so that output fell more than otherwise and prices fell
less.
2. Foreign retaliation reduced the demand for U.S. exports,
which aggravated the contraction through the standard Keynesian
multiplier mechanism.
3. Foreign retaliation against U.S. exports of food products,
which dropped 66 per cent between 1929 and 1932. ..aggravatedthe
decline in farm prices, which was an important cause of rural bank
failures and in turn the decline in the supply of money due to
currency hoarding.
While Gordon and Wilcox elaborate certain of Meltzer's arguments, they
transcend his analysis by Citing the export multiplier as the mechanism by
which the effects of tariffs are transmitted internationally and by arguing
explicitly that Smoot-Hawley would have been contractionary even in the
absence of retaliation. In contrast to Meltzer's emphasis on the
price—specie-flow mechanism, they invoke the quantity equation as a channel
through which Smoot-Hawley had contractionary effects.
In this section and the next, I argue to the contrary (1) that the direct—27—
effects of Smoot-Hawley were favorable for the U.S. economy and unfavorable
abroad, (ii) that the impact of the tariff on foreign demands for U.S. exports
did not offset these favorable effects, and (iii) that it is even unclear that
foreign retaliation swamped these effects. The central point is the same as
Schumpeter's (1939, p. 707), that "[i]t is not easy to see how, had a
reduction of import duties been passed instead of the Hawley—Smoot Act, this
could have improved short-run conditions in Europe without aggravating them in
the U.S."
These conclusions derive from a simple two-country model of the open
economy, drawing on the work of Mundell (1961) and Fleming (1962) but extended
to encompass aggregate supply and gold-standard rules governing money. The
central elements of each country model are three: (i) an upward sloping
aggregate supply function along which output decreases with the real product
wage, coupled with an aggregate demand function whose arguments are relative
prices and interest rates; (ii) a gold-standard money supply rule according to
which money in circulation is endogenously determined by central bank gold
reserves, coupled with a money demand function whose arguments are income and
interest rates; and (iii) the assumption that labor markets adjust less quickly
than commodity markets, so that money wages lag behind product prices. Along
with trade, the two countries are tied together by the assumption that capital
is internationally mobile, linking their domestic interest rates, and that their
central bank gold reserves exhaust the world total, linking their money
supplies.
Many of the conclusions follow intuitively without formal analysis of
the model. In this section I present an informal discussion of the
central conclusions before presenting in the next section the derivation of-28-
results.
The simplest case ignores the impact of U.S. policy on world prices,
output and real balances, and neglects foreign retaliation. This amounts to
assuming that the U.S. was small relative to the world economy and that its
actions were of no consequence to foreign countries. These assumptions are
employed not for their realism but as a pedagogic device. After analyzing the
effects of a tariff in this simplified setting, I incorporate repercussions
and retaliation.
The problem with Gordon and Wilcox's argument that the Smoot-Hawley
tariff aggravated the contraction "[d]irectly, without any retaliation" is
that, under fixed exchange rates, a tariff is expansionary for reasons related
to both aggregate demand and aggregate supply. On the demand side, the
imposition of a tariff switches expenditure from imports to domestic goods.
Only if any upward pressure on domestic producer prices due to import taxation
is exactly matched by an increase in domestic Unit costs should relative
prices and the pattern of spending remain unchanged after the tariff's
imposition. The average rate of import taxation in 1931 was 52 per cent, up
from 39 per cent in 1929; one can imagine that an increase of this magnitude
would, through its expenditure-switching effects, have provided considerable
stimulus to the demand for domestic goods, holding constant the level of
expenditure.
This presumption that output and employment are increasing functions of
the ratio of product prices to variable costs derives from the neoclassical
theory of the firm. Gordon and Wilcox take a different approach to the
determination of aggregate supply, invoking instead the quantity equation.
Since the tariff raised prices relative to what they would have otherwise-29--
been, holding the money stock and velocity constant, it must have reduced the
volume of production. But as Meltzer would note, this ignores the endogenous
adjustment of money supply under any fixed exchange rate regime including a
gold-exchange standard. Since the stock of money was demand-determined, the
rise in prices due to Smoot-Hawley, by reducing real balances, would have
forced the balance of payments into surplus, permitting gold and foreign
exchange to be imported from abroad and converted by the Federal Reserve until
real balances had been restored to desired levels. This may be what Meltzer
has in mind when he suggests that the Smoot-Hawley tariff influenced the
operation of the price-specie-flow mechanism and observes that in 1930 the
U.S. balance of payments moved strongly into surplus while the monetary gold
stock increased.57
Ironically, Gordon and Wilcox's conclusions are correct for a floating
exchange rate regime: under floating the domestic money supply can be taken as
exogenous, and the imposition of a tariff, by raising import prices, will
lower the volume of production (Eichengreen, 1981a, 1983). Gordon and Wilcox
imply that the flexible exchange rate analysis is appropriate since the
Federal Reserve sterilized gold inflows over much of the period. But the
presence of sterilization does not change the fact that the money supply was
demand-determined under the fixed exchange rate regime. The Fed could
influence only the composition of the money supply (domestic credit versus
gold and foreign exchange reserves) but not the quantity in circulation if the
exchange rate was fixed, interest parity held, and the volume of transactions
was determined exogenously.
It might be objected that domestic output was depressed by the real
balance effect on spending. Real balances fell temporarily, the argument—30—
would run, because time was required to generate the trade balance surplus
needed for gold imports. By raising prices and reducing real balances, one
could hypothesize that Smoot-Hawley compressed U.S. spending sufficiently to
depress output and employment. To so argue would overlook that, insofar as
the tariff created an excess demand for real balances which were then
accumulated by running a balance-of-payments surplus, it placed a wedge
between domestic output and absorption, rendering the latter an inappropriate
indicator of the level of production.
it is unrealistic, if convenient, to analyze Smoot-Hawley under the
assumption of constant international prices. When a country has market power,
as surely was true of the United States, the imposition of a tariff or an
increase -in modest duties improves its terms of trade. This presumption
appears to be consistent with Meltzer's position when he argues that U.S.
prices declined less than foreign prices in 1930 due to Smoot-Hawley. But it
is instructive to recall the source of the improvement in the terms of trade
of the tariff-imposing country: its terms of trade improve precisely because
the tariff creates an incipient excess demand for domestic goods. In other
words, introducing the standard terms—of—trade effects of a tariff and finding
support for them in the data provide another indication that the Smoot-Hawley
exercised an expansionary impact on the U.S. economy.
It could be argued that rates of import taxation were already so high
that Smoot-Hawley exceeded optimal tariff levels, causing the terms of trade
to deteriorate. Since the impact of Smoot—Hawley on the U.S. terms of trade
has not been estimated, there exists no empirical support for this position.
But since Meltzer argues that Smoot-Hawley pushed up U.S. prices relative to
foreign prices, this is unlikely to be the basis of his argument.—31—
One might attempt to salvage the argument that Smoot-Hawley was
contractionary on grounds of expectations. Saint—Etienne (1984) suggests that
uncertainty surrounding the tariff's imposition prior to May 1930, and perhaps
also uncertainty about prospects for retaliation, increased the demand for
real balances in the U.S., with deflationary consequences.58 However, were the
demand for real balances to rise owing to uncertainty about commercial policy,
this need not cause a decline in output and employment; under fixed exchange
rates, the additional real balances are accumulated by reducing domestic
absorption relative to production and exporting the difference.
One might attempt to salvage the expectational argument on the grounds
that people mistakenly thought the tariff would be contractionary. Even if
Smoot-Hawley would have been expansionary in a world of static expectations, a
belief that -it would be contract-ionary could have depressed firms' production
and investment decisions and households' expenditure plans. The impact of
anticipations could in principle have swamped the tariff's direct effects.
But such an argument hinges on the notion that agents fundamentally
misunderstood the operation of the tariff. They would have had to base their
actions on an incorrect model of the economy, not a particularly appealing
assumption.
It might be argued that Smoot-Hawley was contractionary due to its
international repercussions. By "restrict[ing) the operation of the
price-specie-flow mechanism" (Meltzer, 1976, p. 460), the Smoot-Hawley tariff
attracted gold to the U.S., or at least prevented it from flowing out,
reinforcing contraction abroad and reducing foreign demands for U.S. exports.
This decline in foreign demand might have dwarfed any increased domestic
demand for American goods. This may be what Meltzer alludes to when he states—32—
that, by raising U.S. prices, the imposition of Smoot—Hawley made U.S. exports
less competitive and reduced foreign demand for U.S. products and net exports.
Yet only under extreme assumptions about economic structure will these
repercussions offset the direct effects of a tariff. Even were foreign
incomes to fall by the same proportion that domestic incomes rise, since the
marginal propensity to consume domestic goods is higher out of domestic than
foreign incomes, the demand for domestic goods generally will rise. Again,
the change in the terms of trade provides evidence on the direction of the net
effect: since the American terms of trade improve between 1929 and 1930, the
demand for U.S. goods appears to have been stimulated.
The argument that Smoot-Hawley was contractionary must hinge, therefore,
on the effects of retaliation. For the reasons described, notably expenditure
switching, a foreign tariff has a contractionary impact on the domestic
economy in the same way that a domestic tariff is expansionary. If
retaliation against Smoot-Hawley was sufficiently severe, the
expenditure-switching effects of foreign tariffs could have swamped those of
the U.S. initiative. Clearly, in the presence of retaliation the output and
employment effects of a tariff are ambiguous. But the movement of relative
prices provides a guide to the combined impact of domestic and foreign
policies. If retaliation more than offsets the effects of domestic commercial
initiatives, expenditure will be switched on balance toward foreign goods,
whose relative prices rise to clear world markets. As Meltzer notes, U.S.
prices, not foreign prices, rose in relative terms between 1929 and 1930.
Unless other terms-of-trade effects swamped those of Smoot-Hawley and
retaliation, commercial policy appears to have been expansionary from the U.S.
point of view.—33—
There is a special case in which a tariff that elicits retaliation can
have a contractionary impact on the initiating country even when it suffers no
deterioration in its terms of trade. This will occur if the tariffs' combined
price-level effects outweigh their combined relative price effects. By pushing
up consumer prices worldwide, tariffs-cum-retaliation may alter the division
between prices and production, given no change in the world money stock. This
is Gordon and Wilcox's quantity-equation argument on a global scale. Holding
the quantity of money fixed and ignoring changes in the velocity of
circulation, the worldwide rise in consumer prices due to import taxation must
be offset by a combination of lower net-of-tariff prices and lower outputs.
But the imposition of equal tariffs at home and abroad necessarily reduces
output only when velocity is fixed; the more interest elastic the demand for
money, the less likely this result is to obtain. Insofar as it is appropriate
to characterize the early 1930s as a period when money demand was relatively
elastic --asa period when the economy was in a liquidity trap --outputand
employment are likely to rise both at home and abroad.
A final argument invoked by Meltzer and by Gordon and Wilcox concerns the
sectoral effects of the policies. Metzler suggests that by raising American
prices relative to those prevailing abroad, Smoot-Hawley depressed American
agricultural exports. This was a source of distress in farming regions, where
nonperforming mortgage loans contributed to the wave of bank failures which
was so heavily concentrated in agricultural areas —-bankfailures in turn
responsible for the monetary contraction that was the proximate cause of the
Great Depression. In this view, the tariff so reduced foreign prices that it
left American producers worse off.
This argument can only be correct under extremely restrictive—34--
assumptions. Since the most generous tariff increases under Srnoot-Hawley were
those on agricultural goods, for present purposes we can analyze it as a
tariff on agricultural imports. Such a tariff, by raising American prices
relative to those prevailing abroad and by reducing foreign incomes, would
have tended to depress foreign demands for American exports. But domestic
prices rather than domestic exports are the appropriate indicator of sectoral
welfare effects. The tariff wedge tends to put upward pressure on American
prices at the same time it tends to reduce prices abroad. This increase in
domestic prices leaves domestic producers better off despite the decline in
exports: it reflects the tariff's tendency to switch domestic demand toward
domestic produce. In other words, a tariff is protective precisely because it
increases domestic demand for importable goods by more than it reduces demand
abroad. The exception to this rule is the Metzler Paradox (Metzler, 1949),
the special case in which the domestic price of the protected good falls
because foreign export demands are sufficiently inelastic. But if the channel
through which the tariff exercised its contractionary effect was the Metzler
Paradox, the indictment of Smoot-Hawley loses its generality and its force.
Gordon and Wilcox are on firmer ground theoretically when they suggest
that foreign retaliation against American agricultural exports was the source
of farm distress. They cite the dramatic decline in American agricultural
exports as evidence of retaliation's effects. Yet they provide no evidence
that retaliation was in fact skewed toward American exports of agricultural
goods. As described in Section VI, many European restrictions on agricultural
imports were imposed in the second half of the 1920s, not in the wake of
Sinoot-Hawley, while those tariffs which were most clearly retaliatory were
imposed against U.S. exports of relatively sophisticated manufactures such as—35—
automobiles, vehicle components and sewing machines.
V.A Model of the Macroeconomic Effects
A simple model can spell out the arguments advanced above. The framework
analyzed here is an adaptation of the two-country Mundell-Fleming model,
extended to incorporate both a supply side and links between monetary
aggregates and gold. I first consider the small-country case before
introducing the full two-country model.
Money demand is specified in standard transactions-balance form:
(1) m-=qy-i
where m is log nominal money balances, p is the log price deflator relevant
for measuring real balances, y is log GOP, and i is the nominal interest rate.
Interest rates are linked internationally by open interest parity.
(2) I =1*+
Thedomestic interest rate equals the foreign interest rate plus the
expected rate of depreciation of the exchange rate, denoted /e. Asterisks
signify foreign variables throughout. Assuming that the exchange rate is
credibly fixed, the expected rate of change of the exchange rate is zero, and
I =1*.Convertibility crises are not considered.
Under a gold standard, the central bank is assumed to peg the domestic
currency price of gold at 11G.59 G denotes ounces of gold per unit of domestic-36-
currency. With the foreign central bank pegging the foreign-currency price of
gold at ]./G*, the exchange rate E, defined as units of foreign currency per
unit of domestic currency, equals G/G*. Letting lower case letters signify
logs of the corresponding upper case variables, e =g-g*.Since the
exchange rate is fixed, it can be normalized to unity and suppressed.
The domestic currency value of a given volume of gold reserves R is
simply R/G. Denoting the gold backing of the currency (the ratio of money
supply to gold reserves) A, the money supply can be decomposed into:
(3) m=A+ r-g
where r is the log of R. When the gold backing ratio is fixed, the money
supplies of the two countries are rigidly linked. To highlight the two
countries' interdependence, A is held constant throughout the analysis.
The consumer price index is used to deflate real money balances:
(4) p =cp+(1_e)p*+(1-e)t 0 <c<1
where p is the log domestic-currency price of domestic output, p is the
log foreign-currency price of foreign output, and t is the log tariff wedge
(one plus the ad valorem rate of import taxation).
Aggregate supply is a decreasing function of the real product wage:
(5) y =-a(w-p)
where w is the log wage and a is the supply elasticity. In line with the
short-run focus of the analysis, the nominal wage is taken as fixed.
Aggregate demand in each country is written as a decreasing function of—37-.
competitiveness (p_p*) adjusted for import taxation and of the nominal
interest rate i, and as an increasing function of a shift parameter Z designed
to capture autonomous shifts in demand.
(6) y =-6(p--p*—t)-ai+Z
In the small-country case, p* and i* are parametric. Differentiating






(7) shows that an increase in t drives up the domestic product price, except
in the limiting case of a -÷expandingoutput and employment. The rise in p
increases with the responsiveness of demand to relative prices and decreases
with the responsiveness of supply to the real product wage. (8) shows that
the endogenously-determined money supply depends similarly on the same
parameters (ö and a); in addition, the rise in nominal balances is an
increasing function of the income elasticity of money demand (since income
rises) and of the share of domestic spending on imported goods 1-e (since the
larger this share the greater the extent to which the tariff drives up
consumer prices) 60
Thus, a tariff unambiguously raises output and employment. If
ambiguities arise, they must result therefore from repercussion effects or
retaliation. To analyze these effects, equations for the foreign country must
be introduced. It is convenient to specify the foreign country as identical to
the domestic, both in scale and structural coefficients. These assumptions-38—
simplify (without dictating) the results.In addition, the two countries'
reserves now must sum to the world gold stock RW (RW =R+R*).Note that
dr =dlog R =dR/R.Then changes in the reserves of the two central banks
are related by:
(9) ydr +(1-y)dr*=0
where y =R/RWin the initial equilibrium. In the symmetric case, y =1/2.
A general equation for foreign retaliation takes the form:
(10) dt* =8dt
where 0 0.
To analyze repercussion effects without retaliation, consider the









If c =1(so that the rise in import prices does not reduce real
balances), a tariff increase raises p and is unambiguously expansionary for
the same reasons as in the small country case. But as e declines toward zero,
real balances tend to be reduced by the tariff-induced price-level increase,
attracting more reserves to the domestic country. The consequent decline in
money supply in the foreign country reduces the level of output there,-39—
depressing the demand for home-country exports.
(a/)(1-ö) >5is a necessary condition for repercussion effects to
reverse the tariff's own-country expansionary impact. If money demand is
interest inelastic, -÷0and a >(a/)(1-e)becomes unlikely, in which case
activity falls. By increasing consumer prices, holding other variables
constant, the tariff's imposition reduces the supply of real balances,
creating an incipient excess demand for money and forcing producer prices to
decline to clear asset markets. Since output and employment depend on the
real product wage, activity also falls. The force of this real balance effect
rises with the share of imports in domestic consumption (1-c). As- , a
marginal rise in the interest rate suffices to equilibrate the money market.
The smaller a/ (the smaller the interest-elasticity of commodity demand
relative to money demand), the more likely are the positive supply-side
effects (which operate through a lower real producer wage) to outweigh the
negative demand-side effects (which operate through higher interest rates).
In the presence of retaliation (9 >0),a commercial initiative may be
either expansionary or contractionary, depending in part on the height of the
tariffs the domestic and foreign countries impose. Through its expenditure
switching effects, a foreign tariff reduces domestic output and employment for
the same reasons that a domestic tariff increases them. Guidance on the net
direction of these expenditure-switching effects can be found in the movement
of the terms of trade. If expenditure is switched on balance toward domestic
goods, the home country's international terms of trade will have to improve
(raising the relative price of domestic output to clear commodity markets).
By placing a wedge between consumer and producer prices, even tariffs cum
retaliation with no terms of trade effects alter output and employment.




Note that dp =dp*under the assumption of symmetry, and dm =dm*=0since
both countries are affected identically. Again, the change in the level of
activity depends largely on the sign of ô -(a/)(1-c).For activity to
decline, the interest elasticity of commodity demand a must be large relative
to the price elasticity of commodity demand ,theinterest elasticity of
money demand ,andthe share of domestic goods in the price index €.
Evenwhen these demand-side effects dominate, if the domestic tariff is
sufficiently high relative to the foreign tariff, a domestic commercial
initiative can still be expansionary. This result is at least possible when
the domestic country's terms of trade improve, as was the case for the U.S. in
1929—30.
These analytic results provide little intuition for the magnitude of the
effects. How large an impact on GOP could be attributed to a tariff on the
order of Smoot-Hawley -in the limiting, small-country case? To what extent
does the introduction of repercussions attenuate the effect? By how much does
its magnitude diminish further in the presence of retaliation?
To provide a sense of magnitudes, the model can be calibrated and used in
couriterfactual exercises. Equations (7), (8), (11), (12), and (13) depend on
six parameters: the elasticity of aggregate supply (a), the price and
interest elasticities of aggregate demand (ô and a, respectively), the share
of domestic consumption devoted to goods produced at home (e), and the income
and interest elasticities of money demand (4 and ).Iimpose standard values
for these parameters to see what they imply. Since the value of the-41—
parameters is known only approximately, the results are merely suggestive.
Still, they shed light on the questions at hand.
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function with a labor share of 0.75,
the elasticity of supply of profit-maximizing firms -is 3.0. Adopting standard
values from a variety of money demand studies, p is set to unity andto 0.5.
oisassumed to equal unity and, as in Sachs and Wyplosz (1984), a is set at
0.8. Finally, in line with interwar patterns, the share of spending on
domestic goods is set to 0.85.
From equations (5) and (7), these parameters imply in the small country
case an elasticity of GDP with respect to the average ad valorem rate of
import taxation of 0.75. Treating Smoot-Hawley as a tariff increase of
seven percentage points (the Tariff Commission's estimate for commodities
subject to duty), this implies as an upper-bound estimate that Smoot Hawley
increased GOP by 5.25 per cent, ceteris paribus. The fall in output between
1929 and 1931 was on the order of 15 per cent. According to this upper—bound
estimate, Smoot Hawley exerted a useful expansionary impulse which reduced the
fall in output which would have otherwise occurred by roughly a quarter.
Continuing to assume no retaliation but introducing repercussions as in
equation (11) reduces the tariff's impact dramatically. When the same
parameters are imposed for the home and foreign countries, 5,andare
sufficiently large relative to a for the tariff's impact to remain positive.
The top panel of Table 6, where the same calculations are reported for a range
of different parameter values, shows that this result is quite general.
But the elasticity of output with respect to the import tax rate falls to
0.37. Thus, admitting Smoot—Hawley's tendency to reduce foreign income and
foreign demand for U.S. exports, the tariff is found to raise GOP by 2.6
percent, ceteris paribus. In a period when output was falling by 15 perTable 6: Elasticity of Output with Respect to the Tariff:




0.9 .360 .337 .317
6 1.0 .398 .374 .352






0.9 .227 .217 .211
6 1.0 .240 .229 .221
1.1 .252 .240 .231
Source: See text.-42-
cent, any initiative which would have expanded production was helpful, but
the macroeconomic impact of Smoot-Hawley appears to have been dwarfed by the
Great Depression. The small size of the output effect compared to the
small-country case supports the emphasis contemporaries placed on Smoot-
Hawley's external effects and on feedbacks to the United States.
In contrast, adding retaliation, assuming domestic and foreign tariffs to
be of equal height, yields relatively little change in the output effect. The
elasticity of output with respect to the tariff falls from 0.37 to 0.23, and
the percentage increase in output from 2.6 to 1.6 percent. The bottom panel
of Table 6 shows that basically the same result holds for a range of parameter
values. Although the direction of the change is expected, its magnitude is
surprising compared to the introduction of repercussion effects. Retaliation
damages the home country by switching foreign demand away from domestic
exports, but that damage is ameliorated by the induced increase in foreign
income and spending. In the case considered here, the interest semi-elasticity
of money demand f3 is sufficiently high that the tendency of tariffs at home
and abroad to put upward pressure on output prices is not offset by the
deflationary influence of the consequent increase in money demand. Instead,
money demand is curtailed by its relatively high interest elasticity, while
spending is only slightly reduced by its relatively low interest elasticity.
Thus, the parameters used here suggest that the case where Smoot-Hawley
plus retaliation increase output is not beyond the realm of possibility. In
any case, the tariff's direct macroeconomic effects were surely small. It is
far from clear that Smoot-Hawley cum retaliation operating through standard
macroeconomic channels was a major, or for that matter, even a contributing
factor to the Great Depression.-43—
VI. External Effects and International Repercussions
If its direct macroeconomic effects were not to blame, Smoot—Hawley still
could have contributed to the severity of the Depression by undermining the
stability of the international system. The most damning indictment of the
tariff is that it unleashed a tidal wave of retaliation which had undesirable
repercussions on the operation of international monetary and financial
institutions. In particular, the collapse of the interwar gold standard and
distintegration of the international financial system have been blamed on the
disruptive influence of the U.S. tariff. The argument advanced by Meltzer
(1976) is that tariff barriers impeded the operation of the price-specie-flow
mechanism. In this view, the ability of the monetary system to adjust to
disturbances was undermined by commercial restrictions. Yet it is not
adequately explained why the presence of tariffs should inhibit smooth
adjustment. The model analyzed above suggests that a tariff's imposition will
tend to raise the price level, which will increase the demand for money
balances, drawing gold toward the country where protection -is imposed. But
this is a one-time effect which would follow the tariff's imposition without
impeding subsequent reserve flows in response to other determinants of the
balance of payments.61
It makes more sense to analyze Smoot-Hawley not as a measure which
undermined the capacity of the financial system to adjust to normal balance of
payments pressures but as one which redistributed gold from countries with
weak reserve positions to a country whose position was strong, thereby
undermining the system's resistance to exceptional destabilizing events.
Smoot-Hawley was imposed at a time when the U.S. balance of payments was in
surplus, when there was no threat to the dollar, and when the Federal Reserve-44—
held ample reserves of monetary gold. By further strengthening the payments
position, Smoot-Hawley conveyed additional gold to the U.S., which further
strengthened the dollar but undermined the stability of currencies abroad.
The value of U.S. gold reserves rose from $3746 billion in 1928 to $3900
billion in 1929 and $4225 billion in 1930, before slipping to $4051 billion in
1931. By 1931 the United States possessed 40 per cent of the world's monetary
gold stock.62 Hence other countries were forced to defend the convertibility
of their currencies on the basis of slender reserves. Some such as Britain
hesitated to obey the rules of the gold standard game, which dictated that
they reduce their money supplies in an amount proportional to gold losses.
When the market was disturbed —-inthe British case by the Austrian and
German financial crises of the summer of 1931 which froze short-term assets of
the British banking system and dealt a general blow to confidence --thelow
level of reserves left the Bank of England little room for manoeuvre. Once
Britain was forced off gold, some two dozen countries followed, and the
devaluation cycle of the 1930s was underway.63 Since devaluation as practiced
in the 1930s was an uncoordinated, beggar-thy-neighbor policy which created
uncertainty and undermined the public good or "international moneyness" of the
fixed exchange rate regime, here we have another possible channel through
which Smoot-Hawley's negative effects were felt.64
Precisely how much greater British reserves would have been and how much
difference additional reserves would have made to the Bank of England's
defence of sterling is difficult to say. Palyi (1972, p. 182), for one,
doubts that the difference would have been great. International loans to the
British from the French and Americans delayed devaluation only temporarily.
But these funds may have been ineffective in restoring confidence precisely—45—
because they were loans rather than reserves --becausethe public viewed them
not as British resources but as liabilities to be repaid. In this view,
Smoot—Hawley is likely to have made some contribution to the international
monetary system's collapse.
The gold standard's disintegration coincided with the collapse of foreign
lending. Between 1923 and 1928, capital had flowed on a large scale from the
United States and United Kingdom to Europe (primarily to Germany, although to
Eastern Europe as well), to Canada, to Latin America, and to portions of the
British Empire. Starting in 1928, with the boom on Wall Street, capital
exports from the leading supplier of long-term capital, the United States,
declined precipitously. Lending recovered somewhat in 1930 before widespread
default in 1931 all but eliminated American capital exports. While debt
default was only one factor disrupting long-term capital flows, without doubt
it was a major one.
There is considerable debate over the underlying soundness of loans made
in the second half of the 1920s. Tales of loan pushing, corruption and
wasteful use of borrowed funds imply that at least some defaults would have
ensued even in the best of circumstances. But a number of observers argued
that protectionist measures in the industrialized center exacerbated the
difficulties the borrowing countries faced in attempting to service their
external debts.65Eichengreen and Portes (1986) identify the magnitude of the
terms—of-trade deterioration suffered by borrowing countries as an important
determinant of the incidence and extent of default. The U.S. accounted for
more than 40 per cent of the primary product consumption of the 15 leading
industrial economies.66 Insofar as the United States had leverage in markets
for primary commodities and through the Smoot-Hawley Tariff's imposition-46-
succeeded in improving its terms of trade, it contributed to these
terms of trade deteriorations and thereby to the incidence of default.
Between 1929 and 1932 the relative prices of wheat and sugar declined by over
20 and 30 per cent respectively. Although it is suggestive that these were
two of the products that received exceptionally generous protection under
Smoot—Hawley, further evidence is required to confirm that the tariff was
responsible for such trends. But as a provisional conclusion it seems fair to
say that Smoot-Hawley's undesirable effects operated in the main not through
its direct macroeconomic effects but indirectly, via its impact on the
stability of the international monetary regime and the resiliency of
international financial markets.
VII. The Extent of Retaliation
The argument that Smoot-Hawley disrupted both the smooth operation of the
international monetary system and the smooth functioning of international
financial markets depends for its force on the presumption that Smoot—Hawley
elicited widespread retaliation. It is important to ask, therefore, whether
those foreign tariff increases which took place were in fact a result of the
1930 Tariff Act. The classic study of foreign responses to Smoot-Hawley by
Jones (1934) continues to dominate the literature.67 The problem with Jones's
account, however detailed his case studies, is that, while acknowledging the
difficulty of disentangling the impact of Smoot-Hawley from the influence of
the Depression, he proceeds on the assumption that foreign tariffs were
retaliatory, interpreting and selecting evidence accordingly rather than
testing the hypothesis.68—47—
Contemporary judgments ranged from those of the tariff's critics, who
attributed every protectionist initiative to Smoot-Hawley, citing
demonstrations by 20,000 French lace workers in the streets of Calais and
protests by 15,000 Swiss clock and watchmakers in Bienne, to the partisan
statements of the tariff's proponents, including Senator Smoot himself, who
wrote,
It is difficult to understand why any one should try to fasten
responsibility for the general movement toward higher protective
duties upon the United States. Many nations revised their tariffs
before Congress passed the Smoot-Hawley bill in June 1930, and many
have increased their duties since. Each country has been prompted
by economic considerations of its own. Only the purblind egotist
can suggest that the world turned to protection in retaliation
against the American tariff.59
The facts are more complex and variegated than either faction admit.
Protectionist pressure was mounting abroad well before Smoot-Hawley, and a
number of countries either had adopted tariff increases or were inclined to do
so before the 1930 Tariff Act was passed, much less signed. Between 1925 and
1929 there were 33 general revisions and substantial tariff changes in 26
European countries, and 17 revisions and changes in 20 Latin American
republics.70 The movement slowed toward the end of the decade in Europe at
least: the number of general tariff revisions decreased from 10 in 1927 to 5
in 1926 and to 2 in 1929. But stability was less apparent elsewhere; in 1927
and 1928 Australia, Canada and New Zealand instituted broad upward revisions
in tariff rates. Tariffs were used to relieve structural difficulties
experienced by staple industries expanded during wartime, to promote
industrialization through import-substitution to raise revenues in newly
established nations of Central and Eastern Europe possessing few other sources
of tax receipts and, particularly after 1927, to relieve agricultural—48-
producers suffering from the slumping commodity prices.
A countercurrent eminated from international efforts at tariff
reduction conducted under League of Nations auspices. The League organized
a World Economic Conference in 1927 whose purpose was to work toward the
stabilization and reduction of tariffs and the elimination of nontariff
barriers to trade. Although the Conference was only a deliberative body,
the vigorous language of its pronouncements "strengthened the position of
statesmen and others the world over who were working for more liberal
commercial policies."71 Immediately following the 1927 Conference an
international group of government officials assembled to discuss the abolition
of import prohibitions and restrictions. They drew up a treaty to refrain
from use of embargoes, licensing systems and quotas, to become effective upon
ratification by all participants. Much effort was expended over the next
three years to ratify this treaty, until its rejection by the single remaining
signatory, Poland, deprived it of force. A similar fate befell the Tariff
Truce Conference convened in 1930 largely on British impetus. The treaty
which emerged from its deliberations was "weak and ambiguous and failed to
arose interest or support."72
Against this less than auspicious backround were superimposed the effects
of the Great Depression. As Bidwell (1932, p. 396) noted, the business-cycle
downturn reversed any movement toward lower tariffs in Europe and added
momentum to the movement for tariff increases. The point is that this would
have been true even in the absence of the American initiative. The question
is to what extent.
One way in which this question might be answered is to ask whether there
existed circumstances heightening the danger of retaliation. Bidwell (1930a,—49-
p. 13) argues that Europe's violent reaction to Smoot-Hawley is explicable
partly by the fact that it followed immediately upon the onset of the
Depression, hitting Europe when its economies and export industries were most
vulnerable, and partly by resentment of other American policies. The impact
of Prohibition on exports of whiskeys from the U.K. and of wines from the
Continent was a major annoyance. More important still was what Europe
perceived as American intransigence over war debts. How could Europe fairly
be expected to service these debts, statesmen asked, if the U.S. made it
impossible to accumulate foreign exchange by blockading the major export
market?
Ultimately, the extent of retaliation can only be determined by
studying individual cases. In some instances, evidence of retaliation is
clear. It is no coincidence that Spain, the most striking example, provides
Jones with his first case study. In 1930 Spain withdrew most favored nation
status from the United States and imposed the Wais Tariff (named after the
Minister of Commerce). Adopted a month after Smoot-Hawley, the Wais Tariff
substantially raised duties on automobiles, tires, tubes and motion pictures,
most of which were imported from the United States. Since there was little if
any Spanish production of these items, taxation of imports was simple
discrimination against the U.S. exports. Spanish officials openly
acknowledged the retaliatory nature of the increases, taken after requests by
producers and export associations ranging from the Cork Manufacturers
Association to the National Union of Agricultural Exportation. Spain reacted
so violently because Smoot—Hawley was the latest in a series of American
impediments to Spanish exports. Not the least of these was Prohibition:
before 1923 wine had comprised Spain's leading export to the United States,-50--
and government officials blamed Prohibition for the trade deficits run
thereafter.73 Moreover, Spain's remaining exports to the U.S. were
agricultural products, to which the structure of Smoot-Hawley increases was
particularly damaging.
In other instances, such as Italy, the evidence is more ambiguous.
Although the prohibitive increase in Italian tariffs on automobiles
immediately following the adoption of Smoot-Hawley, which provides Jones his
second case study, is ascribed to reprisal motives, the authorities in Rome
had determined previously to revise these duties upward.74 Fiat had suffered a
30 per cent fall in sales over the preceding three years, much of which was
blamed on American competition in the Italian market, and for several years
Italian producers had been lobbying for increased protection. The only
question is whether the Italian tariff might have been smaller had U.S.
duties not been raised.
The timing of events provides little guidance on the extent of
retaliation. In the Canadian case, for example, it is clear that officials
were closely monitoring the progress of Congressional debate and contemplating
retaliatory measures as early as 1929. Given the importance to Canada of
agricultural exports destined for American markets, the argument is plausible.
But Canadian tariff policy depended most of all on domestic political
developments. Between 1921 and 1929, with one short interruption, Canadian
politics were controlled by the traditionally low-tariff Liberal Party. When
the Conservatives, the traditional party of protection, took power following
the General Election of July 1930, almost immediately the new Premier offered
a tariff measure to Parliament. Until it is shown that the 1930 election
turned on the progress of American tariff legislation (a contention asserted—51—
but not proven by Jones), the only question is whether the increase might have
been smaller had Smoot-Hawley not been passed.
Similar controvery surrounds the question of whether changes in
Czechoslovak restrictions on vehicle imports had a retaliatory component. A
Franco-Czech agreement under negotiation in the summer of 1930 proposed to
establish a Czech automobile import quota of 750 cars from each most-favored
nation. This, it was alleged, was a reprisal against the United States, since
the quota equaled or exceeded annual imports from France and other European
countries but was less than one—third of American sales. But skeptics
questioned whether the Czechs had any reason to single out American trade
policy as the source of their troubles, noting that U.S. imports of dutiable
Czech goods fell by only seven per cent between the f-irst quarters of 1930 and
1931, at the same time purchases of non-dutiable items declined much more
rapidly. 76
One European initiative, the British General Tariff of 1932, has been the
subject of considerable recent attention.77 This case is notable for several
reasons, not the least of which was Britain's symbolic value as the last
bulwark of free trade. While there is some disagreement over the precise
reasons for Britain's adoption of the General Tariff, there is no dispute that
retaliatory motives rank low on the scale of motivations. There is little
evidence in Parliamentary debate, ministerial correspondence or discussions
among economic advisors that retaliation played much role in British
discussion. The only argument that can be construed as retaliatory is Stanley
Baldwin's suggestion that Britain impose duties to act as a lever to bargain
down the tariffs imposed abroad. The central economic considerations were
domestic --whethera tariff would ameliorate Britain's unemployment problem—52—
and help to defend the exchange rate --aswere the central political factors,
namely the dominance of the Conservative Party in the National Government
formed in 1931.
Given the clarity of this evidence, it is interesting to note Jones's
(1934) treatment of the British case. The General Tariff is spoken of in the
same breath with others in which evidence of retaliation is more compelling,
despite the fact that the principal motives for the British tariff's
imposition were at best tangentially related to U.S. commercial policy.18
What can be said by way of conclusion? Clearly, certain tariff increases
adopted by other countries had important retaliatory components. But others,
including some popularly blamed on Smoot-Hawley, appear to have been adopted
mainly for other reasons. In the absence of a definitive reassessment of the
motives of the major trading nations, it would seem appropriate to view
Smoot-Hawley as but one of a number of forces contributing to the collapse of
the international trading system.
VIII. Import Prices, Import Volumes and Import Taxation
Strikingly, there are just two empirical analyses of the impact of
Smoot-Hawley on U.S. foreign trade, both completed within three years of the
tariff's imposition. The first, an informal study by Hirschfeld (1932),
examines the behavior of United States imports in 1930 and 1931. Hirschfeld
was aware of the problem of abnormal imports --thatimporters monitored the
debate over tariff revision and attempted to beat the imposition of higher
duties by accelerating shipments to the U.S. While aware that this would
cause simple before and after comparisons to exagerate the effects of the.-53—
tariff, Hirschfield made no adjustment for it. Instead he assumed that, since
Smoot-Hawley was imposed about halfway through 1930 (on June 17), the tendency
of anticipations to raise imports in the first six months was offset by the
tariff's tendency to lower them in the remaining six, rendering 1930
representative of the pre-tariff situation. On the basis of trade in 1930 and
1931, he concluded that the volume of America's high-duty imports declined by
more than imports as a whole.
A more rigorous analysis was provided by Hall (1933). Hall acknowledged
that "the problem of isolating the effect of this particular tariff act was
hopelessly complicated by the world depression...." and the procedure he
developed catalogs considerations that must be taken into account in any
attempt to estimate the impact of Smoot Hawley on U.S. trade.79 Hall's
starting point was the observation that, if imports can be partitioned into
two "really large and well-diversified groups" according to whether or not
their rates of duty were affected by the 1930 Tariff Act, the decline in
imports of goods on which duties were unaffected ("Category A") could be
attributed solely to the Depression, and any additional fall in imports of
goods in the other group ("Category B") could be attributed to the tariff.
Between calendar year 1929 and the twelve months ending on September 30, 1931,
imports in Category A fell by 43.5 per cent and those in Category B by 60.0
per cent. On this basis Hall concluded that Smoot-Hawley reduced U.S. imports
by $191 million, or just under 17 per cent. When 1928 imports were used as
the base, his estimate was slightly higher, just under 20 percent.
Hall was aware of the shortcomings of this simple procedure and made
various adjustments for them. He first attempted, unlike Hirschfeld, to
adjust for imports made in anticipation of higher rates of duty. On the basis—54--
of Department of Commerce estimates of articles in bonded warehouses at
month-ends, he estimated the value of anticipatory shipments at $125 million,
$25 million of which remained in stocks on September 1, 1930, the starting
date for the second half of his comparison. Accordingly, he reduced his
provisional $191 million figure to $166 million.
Hall next considered the extent of overvaluation of imports on
consignment due to the fact that prices were falling over the period 1930-31
but U.S. customs statistics were based on value at foreign point of origin.
Since the two groups of imports were large and diversified, however, the
impact on each was assumed to be similar and the required adjustment was
negligible. Hall's third adjustment was for the tendency of deflation to
raise the ad valorem value of specific duties. Since there were more
duty-free imports, to which this consideration would not apply, in Category A,
the interaction of deflation and specific duties would lead the simple
comparison to overestimate the effects of Smoot—Hawley. Hall deducted another
$25 million from the effects of the tariff, reducing his -interrim estimate to
$141 million.
Hall's final concern, namely differences in the commodity composition of
Categories A and B, was probably the most important. Despite his intent to
construct two large and well-diversified groups of products, Hall's Category A
was disproportionately comprised of raw materials that entered duty free and
whose relative prices declined significantly after 1929. Assuming demands to
be price inelastic, some of the fall in the value of imports of these
commodities should be attributed to the price decline. In contrast to the
other sources of bias, failure to make this adjustment leads the effects of
the tariff to be underestimated. Unfortunately, Hall's adjustments for—55—
composition effects were crude and ad hoc. He assumed an adjustment factor of
$25 million, raising the interim figure of $141 million to a final estimate of
$165 million. The implication is that Smoot Hawley's direct effect was to
lower U.S. imports by 3.8 per cent of their 1929 value. Hall concluded,
therefore, that only 8 percent of the decline in imports between 1929 and 1931
was attributable to Smoot—Hawley.
A better approach to this problem would be to use data on trade volumes
and ad valorem tariff equivalents for individual commodities, and to adjust
for the fact that price elasticities of demand, percentage tariff increases,
and import price changes all differed by commodity type. Fortunately, there
exist, courtesy of the U.S. Tariff Commision and the Work Projects
Administration, detailed statistics on the value and volume of imports by
tariff schedule and class number, along with information on whether the duty
is specific or ad valorem and, f or the specific duties, ad valorem tariff
equivalents. For calendar year 1931 this information is provided for some
4,500 commodities in all.
The intent of the W.P.A. project in the course of which these statistics
were assembled was to provide information on every article specified in the
1930 Tariff Act. The format of the Commerce Department's import statistics
was revised in 1934. The basis for coverage was changed from imports entered
whether for immediate consumption or for storage in bonded warehouses to
imports for consumption, i.e., entries for immediate consumption and
withdrawals from bonded warehouses for consumption. The W.P.A. project used
unpublished records for previous years kept in code by the Department of
Commerce to generate import statistics for 1929, 1931, 1932, 1933 and 1935
comparable with the published data for 1934. Ad valorem equivalents ofTable 9: Percentage of Decline inImports Due to
Tariff Increases, 1929—1931
Lower Upper Compromise Group Commodities Bound Bound Estimate
00. Animal and
animal products
(edible) 0.3 2.8 1.6
0. Animal and animal
products




beverages 15.1 129.6 72.4
2. Vegetable products
(inedible) 0.5 890.3 445.4
3. Textiles 0.8 89.1 45.0
4. Wood and paper 3.8 30.5 17.2
5. Nonmetallic
minerals 2.5 77.5 40.0
6. Metals and
manufactures o.i 0.6 0.4
7. Machinery and
vehicles 0.1 9.7 4.9
8. Chemicals 0.1 0.8 0.5
9. Miscellaneous 0.3 10.1 5.2
Notes: Lower Bound is derived from Table7, Upper Bound from
Table 8. Compromise Estimate is thearithmetic
average of Lower and Upper Bounds.
Source: See text.—60-
sensitivity implied by the differences between some of the lower- and
upper—bound estimates. Nonetheless, the compromise estimates suggest rather
different conclusions concerning the impact of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff on
imports of different groups of commodities and on different domestic producers
of import substitutes. Those differences are consistent with the
interpretation offered in Sections II and III above, insofar as those portions
of agriculture and traditional manufacturing which pressed hardest for the
tariff are the same ones which appear to benefitted the most, and the new 20th
century industries like metals and manufactures, machinery and vehicles, and
chemicals which opposed the tariff are also those which benefitted least from
the bill finally passed. Table 9 suggests that Smoot—I-Iawley was most
important in explaining the fall in imports of vegetable products. Whether or
not it was intended first and foremost as a protective measure for
agricultural producers, this was the group for whom changes in import
penetration were most heavily influenced by changes -in tariff rates as opposed
to other factors. It is interesting to note that the fate of domestic
producers of animal products was not so heavily conditioned by Smoot-Hawley.
For certain nonagriculturalists, including textile manufacturers and mineral
producers, Smoot-Hawley was important but it still only accounts for perhaps a
half of the observed decline in imports. Note that these are traditional
industries who, according to the interpretation advanced above, should have
reaped benefits from the tariff. For others, including such modern
manufacturing sectors as chemicals and vehicles, the effects of Smoot-Hawley
were negligible. Thus, the incidence of effects across sectors appears to
mirror the pressures those sectors brought to bear on the tariff-making
process.-61-
IX. Conclusion
As the quotation which opened this paper aptly put the point, economic
histories view the Great Depression and the Smoot-Hawley Tariff as
inextricably bound up with one another. They assign a central role to the
depression in explaining the passage of the 1930 Tariff Act and at the same
time emphasize the role of the tariff in the singular depth and long duration
of the slump. This paper has reexamined the historical evidence on both
points. It is not hard to identify relationships linking the tariff to the
depression and vice versa. But the evidence examined here suggests that
previous accounts have conveyed what is at best an incomplete and at worst a
misleading impression of the mechanisms at work.It is clear that the
severity of the initial business cycle downturn lent additional impetus to the
campaign for protection. But it is equally clear that the impact of the
downturn on the movement for protection worked through different channels than
typically posited. Rather than simply strengthening the hand of a Republican
Executive predisposed toward protection, or increasing the burden borne by a
depressed agricultural sector which had long been agitating for tariff
protection, the uneven impact of the Depression occasioned the birth of a new
protectionist coalition comprised of producers particularly hard hit by import
competition: border agricultural and small-scale industry engaged in the
production of specialty goods. That coalition was able to obtain for its
members substantial increases in levels of tariff protection because of an
unusual conjuncture of distinct if related developments including reforms of
Congressional procedure, the rise of trade associations and the growth of
interventionist sentiment. The experience of Smoot-Haw'ley documents how-62-
macroeconomic distress accompanied by import penetration gives rise to
protectionist pressure, but succeeds in doing so only once the analysis
transcends the textbook model of monolithic agricultural and industrial
blocs.
The importance of moving beyond a highly aggregated analysis is equally
evident when it comes to the economic effects of the 1930 Tariff Act. A
disaggregated analysis of the change in U.S. imports between 1929 and 1931
confirms that the direct effect of the tariff was only one factor contributing
to declining import volumes after 1929. No simple view -—neitherthat which
blames Smoot-Hawley exclusively for the decline in trade nor that which
dismisses it altogether --adequatelycaptures the relationship of the tariff
to American foreign trade. This analysis reveals also that the tariff's
contribution to the decline in imports differed dramatically across commodity
groups.
If studying the political economy of the tariff leads one to conclude
that the Depression affected the movement for protection through different
channels than typically posited, so it is when one considers the impact of the
tariff on the Depression. Contrary to the presumption informing most analyses
of the subject, holding constant both the impact of Smoot-I-$awley on the rest
of the world and feedbacks to the United States, the direct effect of the
tariff on the U.S. economy is likely to have been expansionary. It remains
likely that the tariff was expansionary even when one admits the existence of
feedbacks. In fact, this remains possible and even plausible when the effects
of foreign retaliation are introduced. But whether or not one agrees with the-63-
particulars of the analysis, it is hard to dispute the point that the direct
macroeconomic effects of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, operating primarily through
the volume of trade, were small relative to the Great Depression. If
Smoot-Hawley had significant macroeconomic effects, these operated instead
through -its impact on the stability of the international monetary system and
the efficiency of the world capital market.-64—
Notes
1. It is strictly correct to refer to the tariff as "Hawley-Smoot," since
revenue bills originate in the House of Representaties. "Smoot-Hawley" is the
popular usage, which reflects Senator Smoot's prominance.
2.See Pastor (1980) and the references cited therein.
3. For example, Slichter (1932) refers to Smoot Hawley as "an act of almost
incredible economic folly" and as "a major influence in making the world
vulnerable to depression and intensifying the slump when it came." Bidwell
(1932) singles out tariffs as "among the active causes of our present
disaster." The views of modern macroeconomists are analyzed below.
4.See Friedman and Schwartz (1963) or Schwartz (1981).
5. See Dornbusch and Fischer (1984).
6. See Smoot (1931) or Bergiund (1930).
7. See Vaubel (1984).
8. Davis (1975), p. 240.
9. The first quote is from Bauer et al. (1972), p.25, the second from Pastor
(198), p. 70.
10. Schattschneider (1935), p. 145—146.
11. See Tariff Review (1929a). These debentures, strongly advocated by the
National Grange, would have provided the growers of certain farm crops an
export bounty in the form of a negotiable Treasury certificate worth its face
value in payment for goods imported into the U.S. Under the initial version
of the scheme, the farmer would receive a debenture worth half the duty on the
commodity exported.
12. Swisher (1931), p. 35.
13. See also Lippmari (1936), p. 67.
14. On the old lobby, see Schaffner (1906). A good source on the new lobby
is Herring (1929). The quotation here is from Herring, pp. 2—3.
15. Herring (1929), p. 80.
16. Herring (1929), pp. 80—81.
17. Herring (1929), p. 41. Open committee hearings, to cite one example,
were a 20th century innovation.
18. For details, see Kile (1921).-65-
19. See Salt (1927).
20. The critical planks can be found in Tariff Review (July 1928, p. 229).
21. A concise statement of this position can be found in Berlund (1930).
22. Slichter (1932), p. 520.
23. Alston (1983), pp. 888-889.
24. See Conner (1928) and Black (1928).
25. See Protectionist (1930b).
26. See Protectionist (1930a).
27. See Protectionist (1930b).
28. Ho (1930), p. 43.
29. Again, the major exception is the yarn—spinning industry, which faced
persistent import competition and was avidly protectionist. See Webb (1977).
30. See Gourevitch (1977).
31. See Webb (1980).
32. See, for example, Ho (1930).
33. See Gourevitch (1977) or Bohme (1967).
34. Cited in Capper (1929), p. 120.
35. Walsh (1929), p. 219.
36. Capper (1928), p. 121.
37. Walsh (1929), p. 219.
38. Wright (1929).
39. See Hatfield (1931) and Bidwell (1930), p. 17.
40. This was the opinion, for example, of Swisher (1931), p. 93.
41. See for example Faulkner (1928).
42. League of Nations (1931), pp. 115-116.
43. See Beamish (1929) or Tariff Review (1929c).
44. See Iron Age (1929).-66—
45. Anderson (1923), P. 3.
46. Cooper (1930), p. 210.
47. Protectionist (1929).
48. Protectionist (1929).
49. McKenna (1961), pp. 263-268.
50. Slichter (1932), p. 523; see also Faulkner (1928).
51. See Keynes (1933) and, for discussion and analysis, Eichengreen (1984).
52. Hard (1931), p. 497.
53. Bidwell (1932), p. 399.
54. The price index is contructed from import unit values, from U.S. Department
of Commerce (1976), p. 893.
55. This conclusion is consistent with the relative unimportance of the
price-level effect in the cross-section analysis of Section VII.
56. See Watson (1930).
57. Metzler's statement that the U.S. balance of payments "shifted from
deficit" into surplus in 1930 is incorrect. The current account was in
larger surplus in 1929 than 1930, while the U.S. acquired rather than lost
gold over the course of 1929. What is true is that the accumulation of gold
was considerably larger in 1930.
58. There were statements at the time that uncertainty about tariff revision
was disruptive to business activity. See for example Business Week (1930a).
59. The gold standard money supply rules analyzed here are the same as in
Eichengreeri and Sachs (1985).
60. By differentiating with respect to Z rather than t, the reader can
demonstrate to his or her satisfaction that dt/dZ is negative. Thus, the
model is compatible with explanations for the Great Depression which find its
origins in shocks to spending. If lags in the adjustment of money demand and
a money supply shift parameter are introduced, it would be equally compatible
with the monetary explanation. This, however, is beyond the scope of the
present analysis.
51. For further discussion of this point, see Eichengreeri (1985b).
62. See Slichter (1932) or Eichengreen (1986).
63. For details, see Cairncross and Eichengreen (1983).
64. The extent of beggar-thy-neighbor effects is analyzed by Eichengreen and
Sachs (1985).-67—
65. See for example Condliffe (1932).
66. Lewis (1949), p. 57.
67. See, for example, Conybeare (1985).
68. See in particular the discussion in Jones (1934), Chapter 1.
69. Smoot (1931), p. 174.
70. Slichter (1932), p. 519.
71. Bidwell (1932), p. 394.
72. Bidwell (1932), p. 395. See also Bidwell (1930b).
73. Jones (1934), pp. 34-35.
74. Business Week (1930b), p. 30.
75. Cited in Tariff Review (1929b), p. 187.
76. Klein (1931), p. 498.
77. See especially Eichengreen (1981a) and Capie (1983).
78. The same debate over whether British measures were retaliatory raged in
the American press. See for example the discussion in Protectionist (1932).
79. Hall (1933), p. 405.
80. Because of the inclusion of relatively few items in Groups 00 and 7, and
even fewer which did not suffer from missing variables, the sampling factor
was adjusted to yield samples of 50 and 30 commodities, respectively.
81. Data for 1929 and 1931 are used because the W.P.A. statistics are
available by calendar year and because these are the two years immediately
before and after passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill. Hirschfeld and Hall
use 1930 and the 12 months ending September 1931, respectively, instead of
calendar year 1931 presumably in order to minimize the impact of other
factors, such as the deepening Depression, on the volume of imports. Since,
however, multiple regression is used here, the impact of such other factors is
picked up by additional regressors, including the constant term.
82. In 1932, they then rose by a factor of 6 before falling back to 1931
levels in 1933.
83. All regressions were also run excluding commodities on which import
duties were defined as specific rates. The results changed insignificantly,
indicating that the price—level effect (the interaction of falling prices with
duties fixed in nominal terms) had a statistically insignificant impact on the
import volumes in the samples examined here. This is entirely consistent with
the interpretation in Section III of the results of Table 5.-68-
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